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The Government's Use of the Civil
False Claims Act to Enforce Standards
of Quality of Care: Ingenuity or the
Heavy Hand of the 800-Pound Gorilla*
Michael M. Mustokoff**
Jody A. Werner
Michael S. Yecies
INTRODUCrION
On February 21, 1996, the federal government filed a civil
false claims complaint against the Tucker House II, Inc. nursing
home and its management company, GMS Management-
Tucker, Inc.' Depending upon one's point of view, the com-
plaint was either an ingenious exercise of federal power or an-
other example of the heavy hand of the 800-pound gorilla. The
prosecutor's theory was novel. It invoked the False Claims Act
("FCA")2 in combination with the Nursing Home Reform Act3
to allege that billing the government for purportedly inadequate
care was the equivalent of recklessly submitting a false claim.
Within days after the plaintiff filed the complaint, the parties
settled. The management company paid a $575,000 fine to the
* This article reflects the views of the authors, who represented Tucker House II
in the case of United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc.
** Michael M. Mustokoff is the Chairman of the Special Litigation department at
Duane, Morris & Heckscher in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received his Bachelor
of Arts degree from Albright College and his Juris Doctor degree from the University
of Pennsylvania Law School. Mr. Mustokoff was an Assistant Philadelphia District
Attorney and served as Chief of that office's Economic Crime Unit. Mr. Mustokoff
has written extensively on a wide variety of legal issues, including federal fraud and
abuse enforcement and false claims actions.
Ms. Werner and Mr. Yecies are associates at Duane, Morris & Heckscher. Ms.
Werner received her Bachelor of Arts from Cornell University in 1988 and her Juris
Doctor from Columbia University School of Law in 1991. Mr. Yecies received his
Bachelor of Arts from the University of Pennsylvania in 1989 and his Juris Doctor
from the University of San Francisco Law School in 1994.
1. United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 to 3732 (1994). For a detailed explanation of the FCA, see
Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government's Mistaken Use of the Medi-
care Anti-Kickback Statute in False Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L.
105 (1997); and David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act An Old Weapon with New Fire-
power Is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127 (1995).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (1994).
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government; the nursing home owners, which consisted of the
board of trustees of the nonprofit home, paid $25,000. Both de-
fendants signed consent decrees agreeing to submit to highly su-
pervised compliance programs. While one may applaud the
ultimate result achieved by the government, its legal means and
theory invite closer inspection.
The FCA dates back to the Civil War and the need to protect
the Union Army from unscrupulous government contractors,
who cheated the government: "'For sugar it [the government]
often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, something no better
than brown paper; [and] for sound horses and mules, spavined
beasts and dying donkeys; .... The manufacturers of Colt's
revolvers had been receiving $25 for a revolver that would ordi-
narily sell in the open market for $14.50.' "'4 It imposes liability
on one who submits a false claim to the federal government
knowing that the claim is false or fraudulent.5 Under the civil
provisions of the FCA, "knowing" requires at least deliberate
ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the in-
formation. No proof of specific intent to defraud is required.6
The government can recover three times the amount of the ac-
tual damages suffered by the government, a penalty of $5,000 to
$10,000 per false statement, and costs. 7 A distinctive and histor-
ical use of the FCA is in a qui tam action, where an ordinary
citizen, called the relator, brings the defendant to court on be-
half of the government, allowing the citizen to personally recoup
some of the monies recovered from the defendant." The govern-
ment can elect to intervene, which aids the relator in the prose-
cution but reduces the relator's percentage take.
More recently, the FCA has been used to punish double bill-
ings and invoices for unprovided services.9 But recently, the
government took a new approach. 10 The novelty of the govern-
ment's approach is best seen from the perspective of its target
4. United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp.
607, 609 & n.2 (N.D. Ca. 1989) (citations omitted).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
6. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1994). See Salcido, supra note 2, at 118-24 for a detailed
explanation of the intent standard of the FCA.
7. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
8. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 127-30, for an interesting history of qui tam actions
brought for violations of the FCA.
9. See, e.g., United States ex rel Stephens v. Prabhu, 163 F.R.D. 340 (D. Nev.
1995).
10. See Salcido, supra note 2, at 124-34 for an argument against the government's
use of the FCA for violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
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defendants, Tucker House II, Inc., the owner and licensee of the
nursing home, named Tucker House, and its management com-
pany, GMS Management-Tucker, Inc.
Tucker House II, Inc. is a community-run organization. The
nursing home, called Tucker House, had earned a commendable
reputation as an effort by inner-city residents to provide quality
long-term care to an elderly population with nowhere else to go.
Tucker House II, Inc. took over ownership of the nursing home
from the community, which had filed for bankruptcy. It con-
tracted with Geriatric and Medical Companies ("GeriMed") to
run its home after all other efforts to save the home had failed.
GMS Management was a subsidiary of GeriMed. Thus, GMS
Management submitted the bills for payment to the federal gov-
ernment. Tucker House II and its board of trustees neither sub-
mitted bills to the government nor had any role in the billing
process. As a state licensee, however, it did have a responsibil-
ity to comply with all state and federal rules, laws, and regula-
tions governing the operation of its home.
The government's case against both Tucker House I and
GMS was based upon allegations of inadequate care rendered to
several nursing home residents over a fifteen-month period, dur-
ing which the home was under the management of Tucker
House II. The residents were of an advanced age and suffered
from complications common to advanced diabetes. GeriMed
had a history of prior criminal prosecutions based on illegal,
reckless indifference in the care of nursing home residents that
predated Tucker House IL's acquisition of the home.
The government's use of the FCA under these circumstances
raised several issues. First, is there any legal basis for the gov-
ernment to file a civil false claims action against the licensed
owner, an entity that neither bills nor profits from the billings
submitted by a third party? Second, is there a legal basis to at-
tribute responsibility under the FCA for the rendering of serv-
ices that, however negligent, had not been previously
determined to be either deliberately reckless or per se illegal?
Put another way, does every successful civil malpractice case
against a Medicare/Medicaid provider carry with it the seeds of
a civil false claims prosecution? Third, with other adequate
remedies under state and federal law sufficient to meet the
problems of inadequate care, why resort to the FCA?
1997]
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I. TUCKER HOUSE II: A PRINCIPAL RATHER THAN
AN ACTOR
The Tucker House II board of trustees did not and could not
know that its agent, GeriMed, was submitting false claims as it,
the passive principal, did not participate in the billing practice.
However, Tucker House II received a portion of the reimburse-
ments generated by its management company's billings to the
government. Although knowledge of wrongdoing is a necessary
element of a claim under the FCA, the government maintained
that the agent's knowledge can be imputed to the principal even
where the agent's interests in the wrongdoing are adverse to
those of the principal.
General rules of agency law impose liability on principals for
the misconduct of their agents who act with their apparent au-
thority." However, there is a split of authority as to whether a
principal is liable under a statute for the fraud of an agent who
acts solely for self-benefit, the so-called "rogue employee."
In United States v. O'Connell,12 the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a corporation was liable under the FCA for the
fraud of its agent, who had acted with apparent authority. The
court acknowledged that the corporation had received no bene-
fit from the agent's fraud. However, it held that the correct
standard to determine vicarious liability in FCA actions was that
of apparent authority and not corporate benefit.' 3 The court
noted that nothing in the language of the FCA proscribes vicari-
ous liability, and the purposes of the FCA-to make the govern-
ment whole and to deter fraud against the government-
supported the imposition of liability upon principals for the
fraud of their agents.14 By employing the broad, general pur-
poses of the FCA, the wide web spun by the government could
ensnare a broad range of individuals and entities with a relation
to the claim for payment.
There is, however, a contrary line of cases, primarily in the
Fifth Circuit. In United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 5 the Fifth
11. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
565 (1982).
12. 890 F.2d 563, 568-69 (1st Cir. 1989).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 568.
15. 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966). The United States Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument, citing Ridglea as an example of a court refusing to apply apparent
authority. Defendant argued unsuccessfully that given the punitive nature of treble
damages for an antitrust violation, traditions of agency law prohibit the use of appar-
[Vol. 6140
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that a violation of the FCA by an
agent could not be imputed to a corporation, so as to render the
corporation vicariously liable, where the agent had not acted
with the purpose of benefiting the corporation, but rather with
an eye solely for personal profit.
Unfortunately for Thcker House II, the FCA debate as to
whether a corporate benefit is necessary to impose false claims
liability was academic, as it had received a benefit through the
reimbursements. The government's theory was that liability
under the FCA was appropriate because of the owner's respon-
sibility as a licensee to provide safe and healthful living condi-
tions for its nursing home residents. This is true under both
federal and state laws and regulations. The point, however, is
that it is these laws and sharply focused regulations dealing with
everything from diet to therapy that should be the framework
for enforcement, not the FCA. Mere negligence by a licensee in
its failure to adhere to safety or other regulated standards of
care should not be bootstrapped into "knowing and willful" con-
duct, required under the FCA.
Intuitively, there seems to be something particularly unfair
about a nonprofit, community-based board of trustees being
prosecuted under the FCA for the reckless submission of bills by
an independent management company. This is especially true
where the board exercises no authority other than the right to
hire and fire. The unfairness is magnified by the board's lack of
technical expertise required for any kind of intelligent judgment
of the quality of care being rendered by its agent. Unfortu-
nately for the board of trustees, however, instinctual notions of
fairness do not carry the day. Using the same logic that imposed
legal responsibility on the Oliver Twist character Mr. Bumble for
his wife's misconduct, the law appears to impose liability on the
unwitting nonprofit organization.
II. ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT MEDICAL CARE:
A BASIS FOR A FALSE CLAIM?
In this case, the government used the FCA to remedy alleg-
edly substandard care. Quality of care, however, is a subjective
issue. The government based its action on a Pennsylvania De-
ent authority to impose these damages upon a principal for the conduct of the agent.
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565
(1982) (citing cases holding corporations liable for punitive damages for the conduct
of their agents who were discharging their corporate duties).
1997]
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partment of Health survey that found deficiencies in care and
ordered the transfer of several residents to area hospitals.
Although the government deemed the care at issue to be inade-
quate, there was no adjudicatory finding that the quality of that
care was substandard. There had been surveys indicating inade-
quacies in the care of several individuals who had been repeat-
edly hospitalized, but the board had been assured by its
management company that the problem was one of medical
complications and not disregard. So the question at hand is
whether negligent care can serve as a basis of an FCA action.16
It was Tucker House II's contention that it does not logically
follow that inadequate care, whether negligent or even reckless,
could serve as valid grounds for an FCA cause of action. No
previous finding or adjudication that evidenced reckless disre-
gard or per se illegality existed in this case. Under these circum-
stances, there is no legal basis to expand the FCA to include
violations of subjective standard of care requirements.
Nor does it follow that a successful malpractice case could be
the basis for a False Claims Act prosecution. The elements of a
common civil action and the quasi-criminal FCA are not identi-
cal. First, the crux of a medical malpractice case is subjective:
Was the provider's treatment reasonable when viewed against
the prevailing standard of medical care? Failure to meet this
medical standard of care is not the equivalent of a reckless eval-
uation of that care or even deliberate ignorance in submitting a
bill for the care provided.
The mere specter of allowing health care quality issues to
form the basis of an FCA prosecution is a federal court's
nightmare. First, the use of qui tam suits could become the first
16. It is the grasp rather than the reach of the FCA, however, that is the subject of
real debate. The federal courts are split on the scope of the applicability of the FCA
where the underlying question is one of Medicare fraud and abuse. (Federal law pro-
hibits the offer of financial inducements to physicians in exchange for patient referrals
to institutions receiving funds from Medicare or Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7
(1994).) For a detailed explanation, see Salcido, supra note 2. Recently, in United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399, 406-07
(S.D. Tex. 1996), a district court in Texas rejected the government's theory that regu-
latory violations, without more, can suffice as a basis for an FCA action. In dismissing
the government's complaint, the court reasoned that neither violations of the Anti-
Kickback Statute nor violations of the Stark provisions, if proven, would support a
claim under the FCA. Conversely, in a similar action, a district court in Tennessee
noted in United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507,
1509 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), that "[a] recent trend of cases appear to support [plaintiff's]
proposition that a violation of Medicare anti-kickback and self-referral laws also con-
stitutes a violation of the False Claims Act."
[Vol. 6
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recourse of any Medicare recipient who claims to be the victim
of questionable treatment. This will shift medical malpractice
cases based on negligence, typically handled by state courts, into
the federal court system for no compelling reason. Second, the
true purpose of a qui tam action, to save the government from
the fraudulent actions of its contractors, will be affected by vari-
ous judicial rulings interpreting the FCA in an arena in which it
was never intended to be found.
III. FITTING A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE:
WHY NOT USE THE SQUARE HOLE?
The Tucker House II case presents an example of the FCA
being stretched beyond recognition to redress the evils of inade-
quate care. While the goal is laudable, the means provided by
the Act are both ill suited and unnecessary to deal with issues of
quality of care. Various civil and criminal statutes, both state
and federal, as well as the common law are available to accom-
plish the goals of quality of care without violating the laws of
unintended consequences.
First, the federal Social Security Act ("SSA") 17 carries both
civil and criminal penalties that can be imposed whenever a
medical provider commits any number of violations, including
improperly filing a claim for reimbursement, receiving an illegal
bribe or kickback, or even knowingly making a false statement
with respect to the condition or operation of a specified health
care facility. The SSA also allows the government to exclude
from Medicare and state health care programs a health care pro-
vider who violates the Act. Mandatory exclusion from these
programs occurs when the provider has been convicted of a pro-
gram-related crime or when the provider "has been convicted,
under Federal or State law, of a criminal offense relating to ne-
glect or abuse of patients in connection with the delivery of a
health care item or service."' 8 Permissive exclusion can occur
for various offenses, including the conviction of a provider for
use of a controlled substance, the revocation of a provider's pro-
fessional license, or the conviction of a provider "under Federal
or State law, in connection with the delivery of a health care
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 to 1397f (1994).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(2). Any practitioner convicted of a crime concerning
the delivery of Medicare or Medicaid services or the neglect or abuse of patients must
be excluded from participation in Medicare and other governmental health care pro-
grams for at least five years.
19971
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item or service . . of a criminal offense relating to fraud, theft,
embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other finan-
cial misconduct." 19 The FCA should not be used as a tool to
deal with inadequate care problems when the Social Security
Act specifically addresses those concerns and provides a variety
of civil and criminal remedies.
Second, existing state law addresses concerns of inadequate
care. For example, in Pennsylvania, the state can revoke a nurs-
ing home's license because of its gross incompetence, negli-
gence, or misconduct in operating a facility as well as for its
mistreatment of residents.2 ° Similarly, a provider's license to
run a nursing home in Pennsylvania can also be suspended and
the provider can be placed on probationary status if it fails to
comply with any of the care and treatment standards enacted by
state departments and agencies.21 The threat of the loss of one's
license should motivate an extended care facility to provide
quality care far more than the monetary penalties available
under the FCA.
Of course, a patient's or resident's recourse for inadequate
care is a state tort claim for medical malpractice, battery, or, if
relevant, fraud. The purpose of the tort system is to correct neg-
ligent behavior and compensate the victim. By correcting negli-
gent behavior to assure that care at the requisite standard is
provided, the court is enforcing quality care on a case-by-case
basis.
Finally, a criminal prosecution is the appropriate recourse in
cases where a health care provider's care is truly egregious. The
criminal system is equipped to prosecute providers who mistreat
patients through crimes such as neglect, assault, battery, and
reckless endangerment.
There are only three perceived advantages to using the FCA
blunderbuss: treble damages, an open door to civilian relators
under the Act's private cause of action provisions, and the avail-
ability of the federal courts for what is an otherwise state court
action. The downside, however, is significant. This novel but
questionable theory is likely to encourage relators who lack any
objective standard as to what meets the two-pronged test identi-
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1). The Secretary of Health and Human Services may
exclude a practitioner from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs if
convicted of one or more of the crimes enumerated in this statute.
20. 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1026 (1996).
21. Id.
[Vol. 6
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fying whether the targeted care is so substandard as to make the
submission of a bill for treatment a knowing submission of a
false claim.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the quality of care given to Medicare/
Medicaid recipients must be vigorously protected. That is not
the issue presented by the government's use of the FCA in the
Tucker House II case. The question is whether the exploding
canister of a fraud statute should be the chosen weapon. State
and federal officials, as well as those damaged, have a full arse-
nal available to them, should they choose to use it. There is no
need to resort to the statutory equivalent of a Saturday night
special available to any gunslinger able to spell "qui tam."
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